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Reducing fuel subsidy and taxing carbon have a tendency toward reducing energy consumption
and carbon emissions. However, both instruments may have di⁄ering impacts in their magnitudes of
the emissions reduction and on the economy as a whole. Using INDONESIA-E3 (Economy-Equity-
Environment) model, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which includes carbon emissions,
carbon taxation, as well as, strong feature in distributional analysis, this paper compares and contrast the
two instruments to ￿nd which policy is better in improving the three pillars of sustainable development:
economy, equity, and the environment. The result suggests that given the same amount of government
budget saving, carbon tax is relatively superior to using a fuel subsidy reduction instrument, because it
can accelerate the decline in CO2 emissions with a lower cost on the economy in terms of GDP reduction
with more favorable distributional e⁄ect. This has not taken into account the economic incentives it
creates for the economy to be less reliant on carbon-intensive energy.
Key Words: Carbon Tax, Fuel Subsidy, Climate Change, CGE, Indonesia
Subject Classi￿cation: D30; D58; Q40; Q48; Q54; Q56; Q58
1. BACKGROUND
Today, the human kind is facing the greatest environmental problem in history: global warm-
ing. Without any appropriate actions, there is at least 50% chance of exceeding 50C global
average temperature change during the following decades, and such change would transform the
physical geography of the world, with catastrophic and irreversible consequences (Stern 2006).
The problem is deemed to be caused by the increasing volume of carbon emissions in the world
due to fossil fuel consumption. As a consequence, slowing down fossil fuel consumption seems to
be a more obvious option that can no longer be avoided if the world wants to tackle the issue.
As the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population, Indonesia plays an impor-
tant role in global climate change policies especially as it has been recognized by the international
community that the active and committed participation of developing countries is indispensable
in successfully mitigating global warming. In particular, Indonesia needs to pay more attention
to its contribution to global carbon emissions. For the last three decades, its reduction in energy
intensity (energy used per unit of output) has been among the lowest in the region unlike China,
which managed to reduce its energy intensity by 4% per annum. Moreover, during the same
period, Indonesia￿ s growth in carbon intensity of energy (carbon content for every unit of energy
used) has been among the highest in the region. Indonesia is increasingly becoming more depen-
dent on fossil fuel, way above world and regional average (Table 1). This situation is, to some
extent, related to the energy pricing policy in Indonesia, which keeps the domestically consumed
fuel prices distorted below international market prices; a classic example of policy failure being
the cause of environmental problems.
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1TABLE 1
Growth of carbon emissions and its drivers (pct, 1971-2004)
Carbon Population GDP Energy Carbon
Emissions Per Capita Intensity Intensity
Australia 2.74 1.29 1.86 -0.74 0.33
Brazil 3.85 1.90 1.82 -0.45 0.58
China 5.39 1.31 7.10 -4.13 1.10
India 5.19 1.99 2.92 -1.43 1.71
Indonesia 7.86 1.79 3.99 -1.02 3.10
Malaysia 7.19 2.44 4.10 0.25 0.40
Mexico 4.08 2.21 1.38 0.47 0.02
Philippines 3.50 2.35 0.90 0.11 0.14
Thailand 7.53 1.62 4.52 -0.30 1.69
Vietnam 4.80 1.91 3.06 -2.15 1.98
World 1.92 1.59 1.73 -1.20 -0.21
Source: Author￿ s calculation using data from International Energy Agency
The rapidly increasing international oil price recently has a positive impact on Indonesia in
terms of mounting the pressure for the government to revise its policy regarding the domestic
fuel prices for consumption (Kong and Ramayandi 2008). Over the last few years, Indonesian
government has responded to the increase in international oil prices through reducing fuel sub-
sidy.2 Although the moves were taken on a reactive manner rather than structural, they can
still be considered as a positive progress toward correcting the policy failure in the government
budget management in the country. Further, eventhough these corrections were mainly made
on the basis of government budget consideration, they also have a positive implication toward a
tendency for reducing carbon emissions in the country.
Although reducing fuel subsidy tend to reduce carbon emissions, from the environment per-
spective, this policy is not without reservation. Increasing the price of oil re￿nery product is
not intended to internalize the externality of its consumption. In fact, it will tend to reduce the
relative price of other fossil-fuel products such as natural gas or, the dirtiest among all, coal.
The resulting substitution of coal for oil will tend to accelerate further the growth of the carbon
intensity of Indonesian energy mix, as what has already been case in the last 30 years (see Table
1). This is not friendly to the environment, and not where the global orientation is heading to.
When it comes to the internalization of carbon emissions due to fossil fuel consumption,
economists often turn to a carbon tax, a tax levied on every unit of carbon emitted from the
consumption of fossil-based energy. A government collects taxes on every consumption of fossil-
fuel product at the rate proportional to the carbon content of the consumed products. Because
the government collects revenue from levying carbon taxes, this option can be an alternative
solution to the budgetary pressures from the recent increases in the international oil prices.
Through taxing carbon, the government indirectly increase the price of subsidized fuels (hence
reducing their subsidy burden) and all other fossil-based energy (coal and natural gas) at the
same time. If the tax levied properly re￿ ects the cost of carbon externalities of consumption,
then it will potentially educate the economy to learn the true costs of its energy consumption.
The above discussion suggests that both fuel subsidy reduction and applying carbon tax
are two possible alternative policy instruments that are potential to be considered by Indonesia
in order to address its recent economic problem. Both instruments have their potential to
2Under Soesilo B. Yudhoyono￿ s administration Indonesia has gone through two major corrections in domestic
fuel prices: One in October 2005 and another in May 2008.
2reduce the increasing budget pressures faced by the government due to the recent increase in the
international oil prices. Further, the two instruments also open the opportunity for Indonesia to
contribute further in the international movements on dealing with the climate change problem.
Given these reasons, this paper aims at comparing the economy wide impact of each instrument
in the context of Indonesian economy.
The comparison is conducted with the help of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
called INDONESIA-E3 (Indonesia Economy, Equity and Environment). We simulate the likely
economy-wide impact of implementing each instrument separately and compare the results to
seek for the better policy scenario to be implemented in Indonesia. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the INDONESIA E-3 model.
Section 3 describes the simulation scenarios and closures employed for the analysis. Section 4
reports and evaluates the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. CGE MODEL: INDONESIA-E3
The analysis employs INDONESIA-E3 (Economy-Equity-Environment) model, a multi-sectors,
multi-households Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that incorporate carbon emis-
sions and taxation and with a strong feature in distributional analysis. The structure of the
model is built based on ORANI-G model (Horridge 2000) with three, among others, important
modi￿cation. First is allowing substitution among energy commodities, and also between pri-
mary factors (capital, labor, and land) and energy. In this respect, this model has 38 industries,
and 43 commodities with detail energy sectors. Energy commodity include coals, natural gas,
gasoline, automotive diesel oil, industrial diesel oil, kerosene, LPG, and other fuels. Secondly,
the model incorporate carbon (CO2) emission accounting, and carbon taxation mechanism3. In
this study, only CO2 emission from fossil-fuels burning are included. It means, it excludes other
source of CO2 emission such as land-use change or deforestation. Thirdly, multi-household fea-
ture is added to the standard model not only to the expenditure or demand side of the model,
but also to the income side of the households. Household demand system follows the Linear
Expenditure Demand (LES) system, where its parameters is econometrically estimated4.
The integration of multiple households adequate for accurate distributional analysis is made
possible by constructing an Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix 2003 which serves as the core
database to the CGE model. The SAM used in this paper, is a specially-constructed SAM
representing Indonesian economy for the year 2003, with 181 industries, 181 commodities, and
200 households (100 urban and 100 rural households grouped by expenditure per capita cen-
tiles) was constructed. The SAM (with the size of 768x768 accounts) constitutes yet the most
disaggregated SAM for Indonesia at both the sectoral and household level. The data used for
constructing the SAM include Indonesian Input-Output Table, o¢ cial SAM, and most impor-
tantly household level survey data (SUSENAS). Detail construction of the SAM can be found
in Yusuf (2006). The structure of the SAM can be seen from Table 2.
3This modi￿cation, follow closely the treatment in MMRF-Green model, as described in Adams et al. (2000).





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4In an economy-wide framework, distributional impact of any policy shocks works through
both market of commodities and market of factors of production. The change in real expenditure
of various households then depends on both expenditure and factor ownership pattern of each
of the respective households. Taking into account either one is only a one-sided story. The
model used in this study is able to capture both mechanisms more accurately because the
cumulative density function (CDF) of real expenditure per capita before and after the shock
can be pictured. This makes possible relatively accurate calculation of poverty incidence and
Gini coe¢ cient. Warr (2006), for example, used this approach for Laos in assessing the poverty
impact of large scale irrigation investment.
3. SIMULATION SCENARIOS AND CLOSURES
3.1. Scenarios
The analysis considered two basic scenarios to be simulated under the INDONESIA-E3
model. That is, introducing a fuel subsidy reduction and introducing a carbon tax in such
a way that both generate an exactly same amount of additional revenue for the government.
The equal additional revenue generated for the government here is used as the basis for the
comparability of the two scenarios. More precise speci￿cation for each scenario is as follows:
1. SIM1: Fuel subsidy reduction applied to subsidized fuels (gasoline, diesel, and kerosene)
through increasing their price by 25%. This price increase only applies to households and
road transportation sector.5
2. SIM2: Introducing a carbon tax such that the revenue generated from the tax is exactly the
same amount as from SIM1 (revenue equivalent). It turns out that the revenue-equivalent
carbon tax is Rp. 55,160 per ton of CO2 (US$ 6.1/tCO2).
As noted above, we set the rate of carbon tax in such a way that its revenue impact on
government budget is equivalent to that of reducing fuel subsidy by 25% in SIM1. In both
scenarios, the additional government revenue is saved and not being spent for any other purposes.
In other words, under the two scenarios, the government is running a budget surplus after the
policy is imposed.
A government running a budget surplus as described in SIM1 and SIM2 may not be a
reasonable option, since the government may as well consider to redistribute the budget surplus
to the people. To accommodate this possibility, we also consider two other scenarios, in which
the resulting budget surplus is redistributed to the people.
1. SIM3: Fuel subsidy reduction as in SIM1 but the revenue is recycled through reducing the
rate of indirect tax across all commodities except fossil-based energy. In this simulation
all generated government budget surplus is exhausted.
2. SIM4: Introducing a carbon tax as in SIM2 but the revenue is recycled through reducing
the rate of indirect tax across all commodities except fossil-based energy. In this simulation
all generated government budget surplus is exhausted.
3.2. Closures
In specifying a macroeconomic closure, on the aggregate demand side, aggregate real invest-
ment, aggregate real government consumption, and trade balance (in real terms) are treated as
5Because the subsidy is given only to the consumption of fuels by households and road transportation sector,
the model should be able to accomodate the increase in the price of fuel purchased by those sectors only. Industry
will not be a⁄ected directly since the price of fuel it purchase has already followed the market price fully. A CGE
model that cannot accomodate this fact will tend to over estimate the negative impact on industry and hence
the output of the economy.
5exogenous, whereas the aggregate real consumption is endogenous hence can be interpreted as
the aggregate index of welfare. This prevents, for example, inter-temporal allocation of welfare
impact, due to capital accumulation that may increase welfare in the future (Warr 2001). We
choose the factor market closure, where capital and land is sector speci￿c or immobile accross
sectors, while nominal wage is exogenous allowing aggregate employment to change in order to
allow for non-negligible impact on real GDP (short-run closure).
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 summarizes the economy-wide simulated impact for the scenarios considered on
selected relevant variables. Since the main focus of the analysis are on scenarios under SIM1
and SIM2, the paper proceeds by discussing the results for the two scenarios before considering
the potential impact of recycling the government￿ s additional revenue.
4.1. Fuel subsidy reduction vs. carbon tax
The ￿rst two columns in Table 3 suggest that imposing carbon tax tends to reduce CO2
emission more than imposing a fuel subsidy reduction. The di⁄erence, however, is not really
signi￿cant in terms of its magnitude. This result may at ￿rst looks rather surprising since the
amount of reduction in carbon emissions is supposed to be higher under a carbon tax schemes
rather than that of fuel subsidy reductions.6 However, since we are controlling the amount
of government revenue for both scenarios, a carbon tax under SIM2 moderate the increase
in the price of subsidized fuels, hence moderating the reduction in their consumption and its
corresponding carbon emissions occuring under SIM1. In SIM2, for example, we will have higher
emissions reduction from coals consumption, but lower emissions reduction from gasoline and
kerosene consumptions.
Another possible explanation is given by the fact that at the new equilibrium of the economy,
the fall in real GDP and employment under the carbon tax scenario (SIM2) are lower than that
of the fuel subsidy reduction scenario (SIM1). The fall in real GDP and employment under
the carbon tax scheme stands at almost half (￿0:16% compared to ￿0:27%) of the fall under
the fuel subsidy reduction scheme. The imposition of both instruments perturbs the relative
prices in the economy, which forces the economic sectors operating in the country to restructure
their production strategy and re-optimize their production activities. This event induces an inter-
industry restructuring, which results in primary factor re-allocations within the total industries in
the economy. The new optimal equilibrium re-allocates factor within industries, hence a⁄ecting
their demand for factors. This change in demand for factors, a⁄ects both the labor demand and
the non-labor demand by each operating industry. Table 4 provides the resulting impact of this
process on the economic sectors in Indonesia. In the new equilibrium reached after the policies
are implemented, the fuel subsidy reduction penalizes the output of most of the sectors more
than the carbon tax policy. As a result, the aggregate output and employment under the former
falls more than that of the latter.
Further implication of the above result is that real consumption under a carbon tax policy falls
less than that of the fuel subsidy reduction policy. This implies that under the closures employed
for the simulations, a carbon tax policy delivers better welfare implication than reducing fuel
subsidy. In summary, the similar amount of reduction in CO2 emissions obtained under both
6This tendency follows from the nature of a carbon tax policy that taxes all the products that constitute
carbon content accross the board, regardless of their sources.
6scenarios comes with much lower costs to the economy if being pursued by taxing carbon emission
rather than simply reducing fuel subsidy.
The better welfare implication under a carbon tax policy implied above is also supported by
the gini index and poverty incidence ￿gures from the simulation. Under SIM2, income equality
improves in both urban and rural. Under SIM1, the aggregate income equality improvement
mainly comes from the contribution of the rural sector. In this scenario, income equality worsens
in the urban areas, where households consumption are more dependable on fuels. As a result,
the aggregate income equality is better improved under a carbon tax policy scheme.
Both policies, however, directly raise the cost of production within the economy; particu-
larly, those related with energy inputs. This situation acts as the main driver behind the fall
in aggregate real GDP and employment observed in the simulation. As these two variables
shrank, income received by the household sector in general also falls, followed by a decline in
real consumption as a consequence. The decline in income also has an implication on poverty
incidences. The national poverty incidence rises after the implementation of both policies. The
increase, however, is found to be much lower in the case of carbon tax (about one fourth of the
increase under the fuel subsidy reduction scheme). The poverty incidence in the rural areas is
actually falling under SIM2 scenario. A possible explanation of this result is the possibility that
the re-structurization process took place after imposing a carbon tax tends to bring down prices
of the goods and services with low or no carbon content. These goods and services are mainly
consumed by the rural poor, so that their real income actually increases after implementation
of carbon tax policy. That is, the poor rural households are experiencing a decline in prices of
their consumption goods.7
Figure 1 elaborates the detailed changes in real expenditure, nominal income and households￿
CPI faced by each of the household centiles in both urban and rural areas of Indonesia. In general,
the real expenditure of urban households falls higher than that of rural households. In contrast
to urban areas, however, the change in real expenditure in rural areas are tend to be progressive
for both scenarios considered in this analysis. That is, the rural rich are the one who have to
bear more costs compare to the rural poor. However, both urban and rural households are being
penalized more under fuel subsidy reduction scheme. In the urban areas, the impact of imposing
a carbon tax is also progressive. Conversely, the impact of the fuel subsidy reduction tends to
be regressive. That is, the urban poor tends to experience larger fall in their expenditure, hence
bearing more costs of the policy relative to that of the urban rich. In this sense, policy that
applies carbon tax as a policy instrument is superior to the fuel subsidy reduction scheme.
Change in nominal income, on the other hand, is found to be consistently progressive for
both scenarios. The same regressive pattern on changes in households￿CPI is found in the rural
areas. Relative to the rural rich, rural poor tend to experience lower impact on the prices of their
consumption bundle. For the urban areas, however, the picture is slightly di⁄erent. Under the
carbon tax policy, urban households tend to pay the same price for their consumption bundle.
On the other hand, the impact on prices paid on the urban consumption bundle tend to be
regressive under the fuel subsidy reduction scheme. This result is intuitive considering the fact
that the role of kerosene is quite important in the consumption bundle of the urban poor.
4.2. Recycling the revenue
Another interesting results shown in Table 3 is on the change in the total budget surplus of
the government. The amount of the additional government budget surplus is largely the same
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8TABLE 3
Simulated impact on selected variables
SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM4
Fuel Subsidy Carbon Tax Fuel Subsidy Carbon Tax
+ Recycling + Recycling
CO2 emissions (% change) -3.0211 -3.0605 -2.5428 -2.6095
Real GDP (% change) -0.2662 -0.1610 0.3432 0.4555
Employment (% change) -0.8816 -0.5888 0.3715 0.6769
Real household consumption (% change) -0.4428 -0.2505 0.3918 0.5933
Government budget surplus (Rp billion) 17,387 17,599
Change in overall indirect tax rate -0.4536 -0.4627
Carbon tax (Rp/tCO2) 55,160 55,160
Gini Index (change)
Urban 0.0307 -0.0217 0.0173 -0.0338
Rural -0.0771 -0.0663 -0.0612 -0.0510
Urban + Rural -0.0430 -0.0597 -0.0181 -0.0334
Poverty Incidence (change)
Urban 0.2846 0.1178 -0.1426 -0.3048
Rural 0.0559 -0.0208 -0.3409 -0.4431
Urban + Rural 0.1601 0.0423 -0.2506 -0.3801
for both policy scenarios considered. This additional surplus is, in principal, provides room for
the government to stimulate the economy further. In SIM3 and SIM4 scenarios, we consider
recycling the surplus through exhausting the surplus by reducing the rate of indirect tax across
all commodities except fossil-based energy.
The last two columns in Table 3 highlights the resulting impact of this additional policy
following the fuel subsidy reduction or the imposing carbon tax policy. It is clear from the
￿gures that the accompanying policy reversed the impact on changes in real GDP, employment,
real consumption, as well as the poverty incidences. The reversed impact here comes at the cost
of lower reduction in CO2 emissions and tends to be higher in the case of carbon tax. This is
intuitive, given that the recycled surplus stimulates the economic activity further, hence inducing
more CO2 emissions relative to the case where the additional budget surpluses are not spent to
stimulate the economic activities further.
There are two things worth noting under the last two scenarios. First is the fact that
eventhough the accompanying policy to stimulate the economy gives a higher impact under the
carbon tax scheme, the reduction in CO2 emissions in this case is still higher than that of the
case for reducing fuel subsidy. This suggests that imposing carbon tax tends to be more friendly
to the environment relative to a simple fuel subsidy reduction. Second is the fact that income
equality improvement feature obtained in SIM1 and SIM2 also holds when the two scenarios
are accompanied by an economic stimulating policy from the government side. This ￿nding
suggests that introducing a more environmental friendly policy in Indonesia also tends to be
income equality promoting at the same time.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The simple exercise provided in the analysis has robustly point out that using carbon tax as a
policy instrument to deal with the current international oil prices related problem for Indonesia is
relatively superior to using a fuel subsidy reduction instrument. Compare to reducing the subsidy
for fuel consumption, a carbon tax policy could provide the same amount of government budget
9TABLE 4
Simulated impact on sectoral output (pct change)
SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIM4
Fuel Subsidy Carbon Tax Fuel Subsidy Carbon Tax
+ Recycling + Recycling
paddy -0.19 -0.09 0.13 0.23
ofoodcr -0.29 -0.14 0.18 0.32
estocr -0.48 -0.29 0.19 0.38
livstk -0.38 -0.21 0.36 0.54
wood -0.31 -0.20 0.14 0.26
￿sh -0.20 -0.13 0.19 0.26
coal -0.03 -0.57 0.00 -0.53
crdoil 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.04
naturalgas 0.02 -0.13 0.03 -0.11
otmine -0.09 -0.09 0.03 0.03
rice -0.18 -0.08 0.12 0.22
otfood -0.37 -0.24 0.44 0.58
wear -0.63 -0.44 0.45 0.65
woodpr -0.45 -0.27 0.16 0.35
pulpap -0.48 -0.37 0.36 0.47
chemic -0.43 -0.48 0.44 0.40
petprod -2.44 -1.63 -2.20 -1.41
lng 0.14 -0.39 0.17 -0.36
rubber -0.64 -0.53 0.57 0.69
plastic -0.39 -0.34 0.44 0.51
nferos -0.13 -0.44 0.14 -0.17
metal -0.23 -0.27 0.26 0.22
machin -0.90 -0.77 0.81 0.96
transpt -0.49 -0.41 0.44 0.53
othman -0.48 -0.36 0.45 0.58
electr -0.20 -0.48 0.38 0.12
watgas -0.22 -0.64 0.59 0.17
constr -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03
trade -0.43 -0.30 0.35 0.50
hotres -0.54 -0.30 0.40 0.64
roadtrn -0.79 -0.54 0.08 0.32
othtrn -0.29 -0.51 0.67 0.45
bank -0.39 -0.25 0.21 0.35
gengov -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02
educ -0.24 -0.17 0.33 0.41
health -0.24 -0.15 0.35 0.46
entert -0.67 -0.39 0.35 0.64
othser -0.46 -0.31 0.41 0.57
10savings with a lower cost on the economy. The latter also proven to be more environmentally
friendly, in the sense that it accelerate the decline in CO2 emissions more than the former. The
latter also brings better implication towards income equality and poverty impact relative to the
former. The paper also shown that the government can also o⁄set the negative impact of such
policies by introducing an accompanying policy that stimulates the economy further using the
additional revenue gained from imposing the policies under SIM1 and SIM2 scenarios.
Based on these ￿ndings, we then conclude that imposing a carbon tax is a better policy
option to go if Indonesia is to apply such an environmentally friendly types of policies. This
conclusion also comes with various policy implications that is beyond the analysis of this paper.
For example, one can contemplate on exploring the use of the geothermal potential in Indonesia
further in order to provide more sources of greener energy to support the economic activities in
the country.
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